

## Prospective and Retrospective Presidential Rhetoric

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## Introduction

Presidential rhetoric has been at the heart of much of the presidency literature for decades. Scholars have devoted much of their efforts to understanding the “bully pulpit” as the premier venue for presidential persuasion since Teddy Roosevelt coined the phrase. Examinations of the rhetorical presidency have expanded even more in the last three decades. Much of the focus in the scholarly literature has been on the role that presidential speaking has had on efforts to move the public on issues of public policy. Of course, presidents speak for many different reasons, some of which may not be clear to their audiences. While they might be trying to sway the public on their policy priorities, they could also be trying to do such things as influence elites, raise the prominence of certain issues, or build their own legacies.

The question of why presidents speak is an essential one. Richard Neustadt’s argument that the key to presidential success is the ability to persuade other political actors (Neustadt 1990) has had a profound impact on the field of presidency studies since its first publication in 1960. However, it is no longer clear that the use of presidential rhetoric adds much to presidential power. Recent scholarship by George Edwards (2003, 2009) and others suggests that presidential speech has little impact on public opinion about their proposed policies. It is possible – perhaps even likely – that presidents themselves do not know this. But even if they did, they might still calculate that it is worth their efforts to continue to speak to the public for other reasons.

A classic work in the field of congressional studies might offer insight into presidential speech. Richard Fenno, in his 1978 work *Home Style: House Members in their Districts*, observed that members of Congress go back to their constituents and “*explain* what they have done while they have been away from home. By explaining we mean to include the *description*, the *interpretation*, and the *justification* of their behavior” (p. 136, emphasis in original). Indeed, Fenno suggests that members are constrained in

their policy votes and positions by what they think they can explain back home. He suggests that political scientists should spend “a little more of our time *explaining explanations*” (141, emphasis in original).

We believe that a fruitful way to understand the motivations for presidential rhetoric is to look more specifically at presidential explanations. Just as with members of Congress, it seems likely that presidents are constrained in what they do by their ability to explain their actions. If so, we should find that presidential speech involves explaining the policies and positions that the administration has already taken, rather than simply offering arguments for future directions.

This paper will focus on one possible reason why presidents speak; namely, that they are trying to influence the public’s retrospective perceptions of administration actions. There is, of course, an extensive literature supporting the conclusion that Americans cast their votes based on their experiences with existing government policies (especially pertaining to evaluations of the economy) rather than new policy proposals. If presidential elections are based on retrospective voting behavior, one can assume that the public continues to evaluate presidents throughout their tenure based on its own retrospective analysis. If so, we would expect presidential rhetoric to attempt to prime the public to look favorably on the administration’s actions.

In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the White House shifts from *prospective rhetoric* (messages designed to win approval of policy change) to *retrospective rhetoric* (messages designed to support positive evaluations of the administration’s previous actions) for strategic reasons over the course of a presidency. If correct, this shift would help to explain why the utility of presidential persuasion may be underestimated by measures focused only on citizen responses to proposed policy change. We hypothesize that presidential speech is often as concerned with building prestige through the shaping of perceptions of current policy as with winning support for new initiatives.

## Presidential Motivations for Speaking

Much of the most important literature on the presidency has involved presidents and public speaking. Samuel Kernell's *Going Public* (1997) argues that modern presidents frequently abandon direct bargaining and persuading with Congress, preferring instead to cajole the public to apply pressure to support administration legislative priorities; such an approach undermines compromise and results in policies that lack "negotiated consensus"(254). Similarly, Jeffrey Tulis' (1987) analysis of presidential history suggests that public presidential rhetoric about policy issues effectively redefined the presidency in the 20<sup>th</sup> century; among the negative effects has been an undermining of deliberation in the policy making process and a violation of the intent of the authors of the Constitution. In 1984 Roderick Hart (*Verbal Style and the Presidency*) examined where and when presidents speak, in order to explain the pre-eminence of presidential speech in our political system. In their book, *Politicians Don't Pander* (2000), Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro report that politicians have increasingly engaged in a strategy of simulating responsiveness to public opinion through a process labeled "crafted speech."

Recently, the trend in the literature has been to turn against the idea that presidents can influence the public through rhetoric. George Edwards (2003) questioned the extent to which presidential speaking has any effect on public opinion. Through a careful examination of various historical efforts to persuade the public, Edwards suggests that presidents have little ability to sway public opinion. Even presidents who seem to lead public opinion are actually acting as "facilitators" of opinions that have already gained prominence. Edwards further notes that presidents face enormous obstacles in focusing the public's attention on an issue agenda or framing the debate about an issue, in part because of competing messages from other sources. And even if they do manage to get the public to listen, people are very unlikely to change their minds. Edwards asks, "Presidents, then, find it very difficult to move the public. Usually they fail. If this is the case, why do they keep trying?" (238). In answering this question, Edwards observes that president may have other goals when bringing up

policies to the public, such as to activate their existing support bases or influencing other political actors (244-245).

Scholars have begun to struggle with what presidents are trying to accomplish by speaking. Druckman and Holmes (2004) argue that presidents can increase their public approval by “priming” the public; that is, by altering the criteria that the public uses to evaluate the president. Waterman, Wright, and St. Clair, in *The-Image-is-Everything-Presidency* (1999), argue that the very high levels of (sometimes contradictory) expectations on presidents in the modern era have led to a situation where contemporary presidents are motivated to elevate style over substance. Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha (2006) contends that presidents use speeches to maintain the public support that they already have and to signal their preferences to the policy elites in the Congress and bureaucracy, who are much more closely tuned into presidential rhetoric than the general public. Brandon Rottinghaus (2010) suggests that presidents can have success in leading public opinion, but only *provisionally*; conditions need to be right for presidents to be successful.

A few scholars have examined the extent to which presidents make appeals to the public for purposes of “pandering” or gaining short term political gain. Canes-Wrone (2005) argues that presidents seldom engage in such activity, and instead use their public presentations as chances to favorably alter the policy-making environment. Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) are somewhat dismissive of the term “pandering”, and lament the lack of political responsiveness to the public. They argue instead that politicians increasingly have engaged in a strategy of simulating responsiveness to public opinion through a strategy labeled “crafted speech.”

Roderick P. Hart (2002) has attempted to summarize, into six categories, scholarly explanations for why presidents speak in the manner that they do. He suggests that the scholarly record has focused on 1) “biographical forces” (that presidents speak from their own life experience), 2) “philosophical forces” (that presidents attempt to speak from their underlying political assumptions), 3) “cultural

forces” (that presidents speak according to the demands of the audiences they address), 4) “institutional forces” (that the political system constrains the way that presidents can speak), 5) “temporal forces” (that presidents speak in response to the times they find themselves in), and 6) “mediated forces” (that modern presidents speak according to the demands of television). Hart is critical of presidency studies for being too atheoretical, and calls for an improved research agenda “about presidential discourse” (707).

### **Content Analysis and Presidency Studies**

Hart has other work that is relevant to this study as well. Hart has produced many analyses that attempt to get a further understanding of the presidency and the American polity through the use of content analysis. In *Verbal Style and the Presidency: A Computer-Based Analysis* (1984), Hart created a computer program (DICTION) to analyze speeches by presidents from Truman to Reagan. In addition to many general conclusions and observations, Hart also suggests specific rhetorical styles for each of the presidents examined. Similarly, in *Campaign Talk: Why Elections are Good for Us* (2000), Hart uses the same program to analyze presidential campaign speeches (as well as the words of citizens and the media) during presidential campaigns between 1948 and 1996; he concludes that the interchange of ideas and communication has favorable aspects for American democracy.

Content analysis of presidential speeches has frequently been used as a tool to ascertain various aspects of the role of the American presidency. For example, it has been used to analyze: presidential statements about the economy to demonstrate that optimistic presidential speech about the economy has a positive effect on economic growth and reduction of unemployment (Wood, Owen, and Durham 2005); State of the Union addresses to suggest that presidents have an impact on the issues that the public deems important (Cohen 1995); inaugural addresses and annual messages to Congress to generate five areas where changes in presidential rhetoric in the twentieth century reflected a fundamental change in the presidency (Lim 2002); inaugural addresses to ascertain the existence and

role of a civil religion in America (Toolin 1983); speeches of presidents Hoover through Eisenhower to suggest that post New Deal conservatives publicly accepted many of the basic tenets of the New Deal philosophy (Prothro 1956).

In addition, content analysis has also been used to analyze various aspects of presidential campaigns, such as: Nixon's 1972 campaign speeches to show how his campaign used polls to prime the public on his issue agenda and public image (Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004); the 1960 presidential debates to show that they promoted candidate clarity and the use of evidence to defend positions (Ellsworth 1965); candidate comments and journalist questions in the 1960 and 1976 presidential debates to suggest that the policy concerns of candidates were different than those of journalists and the public (as revealed in public opinion polls) (Jackson-Beeck and Meadow 1979); candidate speeches to predict the "volume" and "tone" of rhetoric about the federal budget (Burden and Sanberg 2003); acceptance speeches from 1900 to 1984 to show that the more pessimistic candidates tend to lose (Zullow and Seligman 1990).

## Theory

*"It's easier to ask forgiveness than it is to get permission"*  
Grace Hopper

We build upon the work of the scholarship of presidential rhetoric by taking a new look at how presidents frame their rhetoric. In particular, we begin our work from the puzzle of why the study of presidential performance has been focused almost exclusively on the prospective impact of presidential rhetoric, while the study of presidential elections is focused on retrospective evaluations. In the decades since V.O. Key's seminal work (1966) on retrospective voting, citizens' reliance on past performance in judging presidents has been the gospel among scholars of voting behavior. At the same time, presidency scholars have kept their presidents focused on painting pictures of policy proposals on the horizon.

While Kernell, Edwards and others have looked to see how often presidents get what they asked for in public appeals, we want to expand the view to include an examination of how presidents attempt to build approval for previous administration actions. There are three reasons why it is important for presidents to use speech to build approval for what the administration has already done.

First, with a highly polarized Congress, there are often few votes to be won on major issues. Winning the support of undecided members of Congress is less valuable when there are fewer members undecided. The role of campaign money, or attention to congressional redistricting, may be responsible for increasingly partisan districts that result in members who are closely tied to the party line and rarely undecided about how they should vote. Whatever the cause, Congress has become incrementally more filled with members who have little reason to respond to the wishes of a president.

Second, with the media environment and citizens becoming more polarized, the audience that is receptive to persuasion in presidential messages is small. It seems increasingly clear that presidents may be pursuing an administrative strategy of using executive orders, executive agreements, signing statements, and other forms of unilateral policy making rather than risking defeat at the hands of a polarized and slow moving policy process. George W. Bush's portrayal of himself as the decider, illustrates the principle of acting first and explaining later.

Finally, administration policies that citizens view as successful can be used to build presidential prestige or popularity that might produce some leverage with Congress for future proposals. Richard Neustadt's original study of presidential influence actually described two distinct strategies for what would eventually be labeled going public. "Merchandizing" involves presidents advocating for specific policies (1990, 83). This approach is the model of presidential influence traditionally hypothesized in the literature. It is appealing because it most closely resembles our expectations of the "bully pulpit," and the strategy was vividly displayed by presidents like Reagan and Clinton. In fact, Neustadt was dismissive of merchandizing because it "only has its uses while events remain incalculable." For Neustadt, the



persuasive impact of the bully pulpit is no match for the results of the real world: “Salesmanship cannot compete with life. Merchandizing is no match for history.” (1990, 83)

In contrast, Neustadt’s concept of *prestige* involves presidents building their popularity in hopes that a popular president will be harder for members of Congress to ignore. Neustadt described prestige as an important component of presidential persuasion because members of the Washington community depended on outsiders and “dependent men must take account of popular reaction to their actions” (1990, 73). Thus, while merchandizing involves inherently prospective appeals to citizens, prestige can involve arguments for policies the administration is proposing or already has in place.

The impact of framing actions already taken by a president goes beyond short-term approval, and the president’s words reach beyond current public opinion to form a first draft of history. Probably the most important and most often cited example of the power of presidential speech to shape history is Lincoln’s Gettysburg address. Gary Wills characterizes the Gettysburg address as remaking America, and asserts that the speech is one of the most compelling demonstrations of the power of words. Presidential speechwriters sometimes talk about “touching the granite” or “touching the marble” as they describe their goal of writing words that will be forever carved into a monument or building. According to speechwriter Robert Sherwood, Franklin Roosevelt knew “once he had the microphone before him, [that] he was speaking for the eternal record—words were, as Sandburg said, ‘throwing long shadows’” (219).

Presidents have both tactical and strategic reasons to spend time advocating for policies already in place and presidential policy action might be judged as only the first step in a president’s legacy. We can expect policy initiatives to be followed up by presidential speeches, memoirs, and exhibits in presidential libraries that proclaim the success of policy. Neustadt’s concepts of merchandizing and prestige suggest that we need to take a more nuanced look at presidential speech and the motives behind it. Thus, this study looks to more clearly differentiate two rhetorical strategies: prospective

speech that advocates policies the president is seeking and retrospective rhetoric that attempts to build approval for policies already in place. We hypothesize that presidents will shift from prospective to retrospective rhetoric over the course of their administration.

## **Data and Methods**

The presidency of Bill Clinton was selected as the initial case study in our analysis. The Clinton administration is a good case to test the hypothesis because Clinton's eight years in office provide a complete time series that will allow us to see if rhetoric changes over time in office. In addition, the Clinton years were not heavily dominated by war or another single event or policy. Further, there seems to be little doubt that Clinton saw his speeches as an important part of his presidency. While presidents like George H.W. Bush have often been somewhat reluctant to embrace the rhetorical presidency, Bill Clinton did so enthusiastically and invested much of his personal energy into the construction of his rhetoric.

To better understand what President Clinton's strategic intentions might have been when he was speaking, we examined speeches given over the course of his administration that could be considered addresses to the nation (as opposed to groups with narrow geographic or policy concerns). Of course, all of a modern president's speeches face scrutiny by the national press and any utterance can quickly find its way to a world-wide audience. However, we selected types of speeches that seemed intended to impact the policy debate nationally. All national television addresses were identified and one radio address each month was selected for inclusion in the data set. In addition, major commencement addresses and policy addresses to geographically and politically broad audiences like governors associations were included.

The selection process yielded a set of 205 speeches. As Appendix A summarizes, speeches selected were fairly evenly distributed across his administration: five of the eight calendar years of his

administration had between 24 and 28 such speeches, while 1995 and 1996 had 19 and 20 speeches respectively, and 1999 had 34.<sup>1</sup> The complete list of speeches analyzed in this paper is included in Appendix B.

Each of these speeches was coded on a sentence-by-sentence basis. The possibility of coding entire speeches as prospective or retrospective was considered but ultimately proved difficult given the challenges of summarizing a speech. Presidents frequently address a number of issues in a speech. This was particularly true given that some of Clinton's speeches occasionally went over 400 sentences long. Further, aggregating sentence-level coding provided some means of judging speech tone more systematically. In the end, we often used sentence level data to produce measures of rhetoric for the entire speech.

The 205 speeches selected for coding produced just over 20,000 sentences to be coded. The first determination made for each sentence was about the tense of the sentence: past, present or future. Since sentences often contained combined tenses or had atypical constructions (such as using the present tense to describe the past), we relied on the coder's determination about whether the sentence was emphasizing the past, present, or future, rather than a strict grammatical definition of verb tense.

For each sentence coders determined whether the president was addressing a specific action by the administration. If so, they needed to also make a determination about whether he was speaking about a proposed plan, or an administration policy that had already been put in place; the reference to administration policy had to be specific. If either of these situations applied, the sentence was also coded for whether the president was discussing foreign policy or domestic policy. Occasionally, coding was not as easy as it might seem. For example, would a discussion of "homeland security" (for a more contemporary example) be considered a matter of domestic or foreign policy? We decided that if the

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<sup>1</sup> We have included two speeches from 2001 in our data for calendar year 2000.

issue being discussed was external issues affecting the United States, it should be coded as foreign policy. Defense policy was coded as foreign policy, though veterans' benefits were coded as domestic. Immigration, similarly, was coded as foreign policy. On other topics, if there was confusion, we coded according to whether there was a specific mention of issues outside of the United States; for example, if the president was listing various reasons for promoting science and math education and one was that it would keep America economically competitive, then we coded that sentence as foreign policy. Other similar sentences without that mention would be coded as domestic policy.

## **Results**

To address the question of whether President Clinton framed his rhetoric prospectively or retrospectively, we looked our data in several different ways. One way to test the president's framing of rhetoric is to measure the frequency with which the president discusses proposals for either new administration proposals or policies already in place. Figure 1 reports the average percentage of "action" statements in presidential speeches broken into the two categories.

The overall increase in the discussion of policies already in place lends support to the notion that presidents do alter their rhetorical strategy over time. In 1993, in the average speech during the first year of his presidency, only 10.1% of Bill Clinton's mentions of administrative actions were about administration policies that had already been implemented. Of course, this is unavoidable since he had few policies in place yet to discuss. This percentage increases sharply over the course of his first term, to a high of 41.1% in 1996. In the second term, the percentage of policy mentions only drops below 50% in 1999 (at 48.6%). This evidence suggests that by the start of his second term, Clinton settled into a pattern of dividing his discussions of policy relatively evenly between advocating new proposals and defending existing administration policy.

**Figure 1:  
Proposal vs policy sentences  
as as an percentage of "action" statements**





Figure 2 presents a similar measure, with policy and proposal sentences as a percentage of all sentences (rather than simply as a percentage of those sentences that mention administration action); the pattern is the same. Again, it is clear that Clinton began shifting to a retrospective style of speaking after the first year of his term and was speaking retrospectively about as often as prospectively by the second term.

While these results may not reflect a total reversal of strategy and the complete dominance of late-presidency retrospective rhetoric, they do suggest a shift to giving the share of prospective and retrospective rhetoric roughly equal weight in Clinton's policy discussions.

**Figure 2:  
Proposal vs policy sentences  
as a percentage of all sentences**




Another way to look at how presidents frame their general rhetoric is by examining whether sentences are directed at the past, present, or future. We pursued this broader view of framing because there are times when presidents are building the case for their policies without specifically mentioning those policies. Presidents may be drawing citizens' attention to the past or the future without any specific reference to policy. For example, there were times when Clinton made no mention of his economic policy, but talked about general prosperity, new jobs, or other signs of economic growth during his administration; it seems plausible that these occasions were when the Clinton White House believed that citizens did not need to hear specific mentions of policy for the President to get credit. Further, it seems likely that there are other times when presidents would prefer to shift citizens' frames of reference by pointing to the past or future.

Data summarizing such temporal framing is summarized in Figure 3. Unfortunately, there are no strong patterns in this data, though a few observations can be made. Only in Clinton's first year is there

a clear preference for use of the future tense when speaking, a greater than 13% higher incidence of future over past tense. For every other year except 1999, the President was more likely to employ the past tense than the future tense, and in 1999 there is only about a 2% higher incidence of future over past tense. Such a result is consistent with our expectation that presidents, as their terms advance, would spend more time speaking about the results of their past actions than about future plans.

**Figure 3:  
Tense of all sentences**



President Clinton was far more likely to use the present tense in every year of his presidency, suggesting that he would have been describing events as they currently were. Of course, this could be because he was either trying to describe how good things currently were, in order to defend his past policies, or to describe how bad things were in order to promote new policies. It is difficult to derive anything meaningful with an examination of tense alone.

It should be noted that although action statements were coded for domestic versus foreign policy, the two policy areas did not demonstrate different patterns and the Clinton data suggests that the administration's approach to discussing policy was consistent in both the foreign and domestic

policy realms. One problem we faced in this analysis was the possibility that our use of a broad range of speeches could be diluting the administration’s intentions when framing their rhetoric. For example, it could be argued that our data is skewed by the inclusion of speeches like commencement addresses that serve goals beyond policy. Consequently, we repeated our analysis using a more selective approach to speech selection; specifically, we selected Clinton’s State of the Union addresses since these speeches receive considerable attention and typically are focused on discussions of both administration policy and the president’s “wish list” for congressional action.

**Figure 4:  
Tense of Sentences  
State of the Union Addresses**





Figure 4 tracks the tense of sentences in Clinton’s annual State of the Union Addresses (SOTUA) with his February 17, 1993 “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals “ speech standing in for a formal state of the union address in his first month in office. As with other measures of sentence tense, the focus on Clinton’s state of the union messages does not present a clear picture of any shifting strategy.



**Figure 5:  
Proposal vs policy sentences  
State of the Union Addresses**



Similarly, Figure 5 focuses on action statements only in the state of the union addresses. In that figure, there is much less of a balance between proposals and existing policy. However, since launching the president’s agenda for the coming year is the central function of the SOTUA, this is not surprising.

**Conclusion**

While presidential rhetoric has enjoyed a prominent place in scholarly and journalistic views of the presidency, political scientists have only recently begun to seriously examine what that rhetoric looks like. The challenges of creating meaningful and systematic means of coding rhetoric will continue to challenge the patience of researchers. However, the need to understand what the president says remains.

We have modified the question of *what* the president is talking about to include *when* the president is talking about. We suspect that presidential attempts to direct citizens to look to the past, present, or future is an important part of their message strategy that needs to be understood when

analyzing the impact of presidential rhetoric. Voters who judge presidential incumbents based on retrospective evaluations may use such rhetorical cues when judging the desirability of presidential policies.

The data collected on the Clinton administration suggests that Clinton shifted his focus from advocating new policies to a balance between advocating the new while defending the old. This stands out, despite the lack of a systematic shift in the “tense” of presidential rhetoric over the course of an administration.

Clearly, further research is needed to develop a better understanding of the shifting strategies deployed by the White House and the interaction between advocating for new proposals and defending policies already in place. However, results so far do suggest that focusing exclusively on the ability to win support for new policy may leave us with an incomplete picture of presidential persuasion and the message coming from the bully pulpit.

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## **Appendix A**

### **Total Number of Speeches and Sentences by Year**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Speeches</b>	<b>Sentences</b>
<b>1993</b>	28	3,632
<b>1994</b>	25	2,309
<b>1995</b>	24	2,385
<b>1996</b>	19	1,900
<b>1997</b>	20	2,036
<b>1998</b>	27	2,172
<b>1999</b>	34	3,140
<b>2000</b>	28	2,784
<b>Total</b>	205	20,358

## Appendix B:

### Speeches included in the analysis

#### 1993

2/6/93	The President's Radio Address	8/16/93	Remarks to the National Governors' Association in Tulsa, Oklahoma
2/15/93	Address to the Nation on the Economic Program	8/28/93	The President's Radio Address
2/17/93	Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals	9/18/93	The President's Radio Address
3/6/93	The President's Radio Address	9/22/93	Address to a Joint Session of the Congress on Health Care Reform
4/1/93	Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis	9/27/93	Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
4/3/93	The President's Radio Address	10/2/93	The President's Radio Address
4/25/93	Remarks to the Newspaper Association of America in Boston	10/7/93	Address to the Nation on Somalia
5/1/93	The President's Radio Address	10/9/93	Remarks at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut
6/5/93	The President's Radio Address	10/12/93	Remarks at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill
6/26/93	Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters	10/28/93	Remarks to the Medical Community at Johns Hopkins University
7/3/93	The President's Radio Address	11/2/93	Remarks on Endorsements of the North American Free Trade Agreement
7/17/93	The President's Radio Address	11/6/93	The President's Radio Address
7/31/93	Remarks on the Economic Program	12/4/93	The President's Radio Address
8/3/93	Address to the Nation on the Economic Program		
8/7/93	The President's Radio Address		

#### 1994

1/15/94	The President's Radio Address	8/3/94	Remarks to Health Security Express Participants
1/25/94	Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union	8/6/94	The President's Radio Address
1/28/94	Remarks to a National Conference of Mayors	8/12/94	Remarks to the National Association of Police Organizations in Minneapolis, Minnesota
2/1/94	Remarks to the National Governors' Association	9/10/94	The President's Radio Address
2/5/94	The President's Radio Address	9/15/94	Address to the Nation on Haiti
3/5/94	The President's Radio Address	9/26/94	Remarks to the 49th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
4/2/94	The President's Radio Address	10/1/94	The President's Radio Address
5/7/94	The President's Radio Address	10/10/94	Address to the Nation on Iraq
5/25/94	Remarks at the United States Naval Academy Commencement Ceremony in Annapolis, Maryland	10/13/94	Remarks to the National Association of Police Organizations
6/4/94	The President's Radio Address	11/5/94	The President's Radio Address
7/9/94	The President's Radio Address	11/28/94	Remarks on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
7/30/94	Remarks to Health Security Express Participants in Independence, MO	12/3/94	The President's Radio Address
		12/15/94	Address to the Nation on the Middle Class Bill of Rights

## 1995

1/7/95	The President's Radio Address	6/13/95	Address to the Nation on the Plan To Balance the Budget
1/24/95	Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union	6/27/95	Remarks to Students at Portland State University in Portland
1/31/95	Remarks to the National Governors' Association Conference	7/8/95	The President's Radio Address
2/4/95	The President's Radio Address	7/31/95	Remarks to the National Governors' Association in Burlington, Vermont
3/4/95	The President's Radio Address	8/5/95	The President's Radio Address
3/16/95	Remarks to the National Conference of State Legislatures	9/9/95	The President's Radio Address
4/1/95	The President's Radio Address	10/7/95	The President's Radio Address
4/25/95	Remarks to Students at Iowa State University in Ames	10/16/95	Remarks at the University of Texas at Austin
5/5/95	Remarks at the Michigan State University Commencement Ceremony in East Lansing, Michigan	11/4/95	The President's Radio Address
5/13/95	The President's Radio Address	11/10/95	Remarks on the Budget Debate
6/3/95	The President's Radio Address	11/14/95	Remarks on the Federal Government Shutdown
		12/9/95	The President's Radio Address
		12/15/95	Remarks on the Budget Negotiations

## 1996

1/6/96	The President's Radio Address	5/4/96	The President's Radio Address
1/18/96	Remarks on the Budget Negotiations	6/8/96	The President's Radio Address
1/23/96	Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union	6/4/96	Remarks at the Princeton University Commencement Ceremony in Princeton, New Jersey
2/3/96	The President's Radio Address	7/13/96	The President's Radio Address
3/2/96	The President's Radio Address	7/16/96	Remarks to the National Governors' Association Conference
3/27/96	Remarks to the National Governors' Association Education Summit in Palisades, New York	8/3/96	The President's Radio Address
4/6/96	The President's Radio Address	9/7/96	The President's Radio Address
4/29/96	Remarks on the National Drug Control Strategy in Coral Gables, Florida	9/25/96	Remarks at Robert Morris College in Coraopolis, Pennsylvania
		10/5/96	The President's Radio Address
		11/9/96	The President's Radio Address
		12/14/96	The President's Radio Address

## 1997

1/11/97	The President's Radio Address	5/10/97	The President's Radio Address
1/20/97	Inaugural Address,	5/31/97	Commencement Address at the
2/4/97	Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union	6/14/97	United States Military Academy in West Point, New York
2/15/97	The President's Radio Address	7/12/97	The President's Radio Address
2/19/97	Remarks at the University of Massachusetts in Boston	7/29/97	Remarks on the Balanced Budget Agreement
3/1/97	The President's Radio Address	8/2/97	The President's Radio Address
3/6/97	Remarks to a Joint Session of the Michigan State Legislature in Lansing	9/9/97	Remarks at American University
4/5/97	The President's Radio Address	9/13/97	The President's Radio Address
4/20/97	Remarks to the United Auto Workers	10/4/97	The President's Radio Address
		11/8/97	The President's Radio Address
		12/13/97	The President's Radio Address

## 1998

1/10/98	The President's Radio Address	8/17/98	Address to the Nation on Testimony Before the Independent Counsel's Grand Jury
1/27/98	Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union	8/20/98	Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan
2/14/98	The President's Radio Address	9/12/98	The President's Radio Address
2/23/98	Remarks at the National Governors' Association Meeting	9/14/98	Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City,
3/7/98	The President's Radio Address	9/17/98	Remarks to the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Convention
4/4/98	The President's Radio Address	10/1/98	Remarks on the Legislative Agenda for Education,
5/2/98	The President's Radio Address	10/3/98	The President's Radio Address
5/22/98	Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland,	11/7/98	The President's Radio Address
6/6/98	The President's Radio Address	11/10/98	Remarks to the National Townhall Meeting on Trade
6/8/98	Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem in New York City	12/5/98	The President's Radio Address
6/13/98	Commencement Address at Portland State University in Portland, Oregon	12/16/98	Address to the Nation Announcing Military Strikes on Iraq,
7/9/98	Remarks on Launching the National Youth Antidrug Media Campaign in Atlanta, Georgia	12/19/98	Address to the Nation on Completion of Military Strikes in Iraq
7/11/98	The President's Radio Address	12/19/98	Remarks Following the House of Representatives Vote on Impeachment
8/1/98	The President's Radio Address		



## 1999

1/6/99	Remarks on the Budget Surplus for Fiscal Year 1999	5/19/99	Remarks on Proposed Legislation To Reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
1/9/99	The President's Radio Address	5/23/99	Commencement Address at Grambling State University in Grambling, Louisiana
1/19/99	Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union	6/2/99	Commencement Address at the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs
1/25/99	Remarks on the Welfare to Work Initiative	6/10/99	Address to the Nation on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo
2/1/99	Remarks on Submitting the Fiscal Year 2000 Budget	6/12/99	The President's Radio Address
2/3/99	Remarks to the American Association of Retired Persons National Legislative Council	7/9/99	Remarks on the Patients' Bill of Rights in Torrance, California
2/6/99	The President's Radio Address	7/10/99	The President's Radio Address
2/17/99	Remarks on Legislative Priorities for the Budget Surplus	7/27/99	Remarks on Medicare Benefits for Women
2/22/99	Remarks at the National Governors' Association Meeting	8/7/99	The President's Radio Address
2/26/99	Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco	9/9/99	Remarks on Combating Crime
3/6/99	The President's Radio Address	9/11/99	The President's Radio Address
3/24/99	Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	9/30/99	Remarks at the National Education Summit in Palisades, New York
4/3/99	The President's Radio Address	10/2/99	The President's Radio Address
4/6/99	Remarks on Proposed Hate Crimes Prevention Legislation	10/6/99	Remarks on the Legislative Agenda
4/30/99	Remarks Announcing Measures To Address School Violence	10/25/99	Remarks on Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage
5/1/99	The President's Radio Address	11/6/99	The President's Radio Address
		12/3/99	Remarks on the National Economy
		12/4/99	The President's Radio Address

## 2000

6/3/00	The President's Radio Address	8/12/00	The President's Radio Address
4/1/00	The President's Radio Address	5/17/00	Commencement Address at the United States Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut
9/5/00	Remarks on the Legislative Agenda	10/27/00	Remarks to African-American Community Leaders
2/7/00	Remarks on Releasing the Fiscal Year 2001 Federal Budget	12/8/00	Remarks at the University of Nebraska at Kearney, Nebraska
1/24/00	Remarks Announcing the Equal Pay Initiative	5/6/00	The President's Radio Address
10/7/00	The President's Radio Address	9/21/00	Proposed Conservation Legislation
11/4/00	The President's Radio Address	7/6/00	Remarks at the University of Missouri in Columbia, Missouri
12/2/00	The President's Radio Address	9/1/00	Remarks at Georgetown University
1/8/00	The President's Radio Address	9/9/00	The President's Radio Address
1/27/00	Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union	4/28/00	Remarks Announcing a Gun Buyback Initiative
2/5/00	The President's Radio Address	9/26/00	Remarks at Georgetown University Law School
9/29/00	Remarks on the Children's Health Insurance Program	3/4/00	The President's Radio Address
4/30/00	Commencement Address at Eastern Michigan University in Ypsilanti, Michigan	7/8/00	The President's Radio Address

## 2001

1/6/01	The President's Radio Address
1/18/01	Farewell Address to the Nation